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THE RESTATEMENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY
FRED C. ZACHARIAS*
By the time this symposium goes to press, the ALI membership will have just
discussed, and perhaps approved or amended, the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers' proposed chapter on attorney-client confidentiality.' In a separate piece,2
I have already summarized the tentative draft, compared it against the Code of
Professional Responsibility3 and the Model Rules, and analyzed the draft's pro-
posed changes.' Because that analysis by now may be moot, it does not pay to
reiterate it here.
In thinking about this symposium, though, I came to the conclusion that it is hard
to find anything to say about attorney-client confidentiality that an audience of
professional responsibility teachers and scholars does not already know. All in the
field have already heard and read the debates on the confidentiality exceptions.6
They teach the issues. What can I say that's new?
In an attempt to add something meaningful to the debate, I have decided to focus
this piece on a question similar to the ones considered by Professors Wolfram7 and
Schneyer.' I will look at two of the more significant changes that the tentative draft
© 1993 Fred C. Zacharias
* Professor, University of San Diego Law School. LL.M., 1981, Georgetown University Law Center,
J.D., 1977, Yale Law School; B.A., 1974, Johns Hopkins University. My thanks go to Bryan Holland
for research help, my wife Sharon Soroko for editing assistance, and Carl Auerbach for useful and
insightful comments.
1. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. V, topic I (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1990).
Some of the ALI's tentative draft on confidentiality has been approved by the ALI members, while other
subjects remain to be discussed at the ALI's May 1993 Annual Meeting.
2. See Fred C. Zacharias, Fact and Fiction in the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers;
Should the Confidentiality Provisions, Restate the Law, 6 GEo. J. LEG. EmIcs 903 (1993) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Fact and Fiction]. With the blessing of both the Oklahoma Law Review and the Georgetown
Journal of Legal Ethics, the Georgetown piece expands upon the ideas expressed in this symposium and
places them in the context of a symposium addressing the ways professional responsibility regulation
might proceed a decade after the adoption of the Model Rules.
3. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 15-41 for a discussion of some of these changes.
6. Compare, e.g., MONROE FREEDiAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYsTEM (1975)
(supporting strict confidentiality), Monroe Freedman, Are the Model Rules Unconstitutional, 35 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 685 (1981), and Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A defense, A Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. BAR. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (same) with Robert Gordon, The Independence
of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REy. 1, 11 (1988) (discussing dispute about strict confidentiality outside of the
criminal context), John T. Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966) (urging limits to confidentiality), and Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the
Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 150 (David Luban
ed., 1983) (questioning strict confidentiality in civil cases).
7. Charles W. Wolfram, Legal Ethics and the Restatement Process: The Uncomfortable Fit, 46
OKLA. L. REV. 13 (1993) [hereinafter Wolfram, Legal Ethics].
8. Ted Schneyer, The New Restatement and the Ethics Codes- Complements or Rivals?, 46 OKLA.
L. REV. 25 (1993).
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of the Restatement includes and ask what kinds of changes a restatement justifiably
may propose. More particularly, I will consider whether the ALI, in the draft
sections on confidentiality, has acted in an appropriate way.
In his introduction, Professor Wolfram has already mentioned these subjects, by
way of setting out his view of the role of the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers.9 Professor Wolfram proffers the ALI's intent to confine the new
restatement to reporting the law as it exists in the states." That position is a bit
surprising, for it is somewhat inconsistent with Professor Wolfram's own plan for
the Restatement," the ALI's public policy regarding restatements in general," and,
most importantly, the reality that law is often changeable and incapable of being
restated in universally acceptable terms. 3
One can interpret Professor Wolfram's comments in several ways. He may be
acting in his capacity as a spokesman for the ALI membership and thus mayhave
to take this public position to bolster the reputation and the potential persuasive
effect of the Restatement. Alternatively, in the context of a casual symposium
speech, Professor Wolfram inadvertently may have taken a position broader and
stronger than he actually intends. It would, for example, be perfectly consistent with
Professor Wolfram's earlier view for him to express a preference for "restating"
existing law, when it seems reasonable and possible, while reserving the option to
push the envelop in other situations. Or - and this would not surprise me,
considering Professor Wolfram's original blueprint for the Restatement - Professor
Wolfram's comments may have been addressing the limited situation in which only
one version of the law exists to be restated, leaving the ALI the option of selecting
the "best" rule whenever two or more lines of settled authority exist. 4
In fairness to Prof.essor Wolfram, I prefer not to put too much stock in his
passing characterization of the Restatement. The work speaks for itself. I will
consider the text of the draft, and try to draw from it some conclusions about what
the Restatement oftthz Law Governing Lawyers does and about what it should do.
The two proposals I will focus on are section 117B and comment d to section
117B. Section 117B allows lawyers to disclose confidences to prevent crimes or
9. Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 15 (discussing what "the Restatement is trying to be at
its most fundamental level ').
10. Il at 16.
11. Charles W. Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHicS 195, 202 (1987) ("[T]he reporters will attempt to offer more than a wooden recitation of
law that is already incontrovertibly in place.") [hereinafter Wolfram, Concept].
12. See infra text accompanying notes 41-54.
13. See Arthur L. Corin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Laiv Institute, 15
IOWA L. REV 19, 24-26 (1929) (discussing and rejecting notion that there is a fixed common law
applicable throughout the United States).
14. Wolfram, Concept, supra note 11, at 196 ("If courts in different states follow conflicting rules,
the restatements seek to dhine the better path, which is not necessarily the path more frequently trod.");
cf Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 17 (suggesting that "[wihere there is a significant difference
among the lawyer code formulations ... we choose that formulation that seems to us to be the most
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fraud that threaten third persons with financial harm. Comment d would let lawyers
disclose to prevent future consequences of some past acts.
The reporters offer alternative versions of section 117B. Both - in contrast to
the Model Rules15 - would allow some disclosures to prevent financial harm.16
This piece will not discuss the countervailing arguments concerning the substance
of these alternatives, although personally I tend to sympathize with the Restatement
positions." What I want to analyze here is the reporters' rationale for "restating"
as the law the position taken by the Kutak Commission," that ultimately was
rejected in the Model Rules.
The reporters' justification is a three-step syllogism:
(1) Whether lawyers should disclose to prevent financial harm remains a matter
of debate;
(2) We, the reporters, think section 117B is the best approach.
(3) Of the 35 or 36 states that have adopted a code since the Model Rules came
into being, a minority has followed Rule 1.6's limited position, and many allow
disclosure to stop financial harm.
15. Model Rule 1.6 provides, in pertinent part: "A lawyer may reveal [confidential] information to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
16. Alternative 1 to § 117B provides:
Following an attempt by the lawyer, if feasible, to dissuade the client, a lawyer may use
or disclose confidential client information if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes:
(1) The client intends to commit a crime or fraud that threatens to cause substantial
financial loss; and
(2) The lawyer's use or disclosure is:
(a) Reasonably appropriate to prevent the act; and
(b) Necessary in view of the imminence of the substantial financial loss.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs § 117B (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1990) (alternative 1).
Alternative 2 to § 117B provides:
Following an attempt by the lawyer, if feasible, to dissuade the client, a lawyer may use
or disclose confidential client information if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes:
(1) The client intends to commit a crime or fraud that threatens to cause substantial
financial loss;
(2) The lawyer's services were employed in the client's course of conduct and the
loss is likely to occur if the lawyer takes no action; and
(3) The lawyer's use or disclosure is:
(a) Reasonably appropriate to prevent the act; and
(b) Necessary in view of the imminence of the substantial financial loss.
Id. § 117B (alternative 2).
17. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989)
(questioning rigid confidentiality rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Model Rules)
[hereinafter Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality].
18. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 (Proposed Final Draft, 1981) (proposing
rule permitting disclosure to prevent a client from committing a crime or fraud likely to cause substantial
physical or financial injury).
19. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). See supra note 15.
1993]
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So, the notes suggest (although they don't quite say it) that the Restatement position
actually reflects the current state of the law.'
The reporters are absolutely right to conclude that Model Rule 1.6 has not been
met with a bundle of enthusiasm.' However, the same is true for the restatement
position. Although only seven states have adopted Rule 1.6,' just six states have
adopted the ALI approach.? That approach was presented to the states as an option
by the Kutak Commission proposals.
It is obviously dangerous to rely on statistics, which have a potential for being
misleading.' Yet we must consider the facts. If we look at what the states actually
are doing, we see that the overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions prefer more liberal
disclosure exceptions than the Restatement suggests. The preference is manifested
in one of two types of confidentiality rules. Thirty states hold to the Code of
Professional Responsibility position that all future crimes are disclosable, regardless
of the nature or extent of harm.' Six states use a Model Rule or Restatement
provision and make ;ome of the hitherto permissive disclosures mandatory.' In
other words, forty-two jurisdictions reject Model Rule 1.6, but thirty-six of those
20. See REsrATiENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117B cmt. b, at 61 (Tentative Draft
No. 3, 1990); id. § 117B, nt 71 reporter's note.
21. Throughout this article, I equate positions taken by the ALI and the comments in the reporters'
notes. As a technical matter, that is wrong, because the ALI insists that the reporters notes are
nonbinding and may depart from the common law in a way the body of a restatement may not. See
Wolfram, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 16-17. There is a real question whether readers, in their minds,
can separate the text and notes in this way. See Schneyer, supra note 8, at 31-32 (questioning whether
judges will honor the assertion that the reporters' notes are not part of the restatement). Even if they can,
however, that would not undermine my approach here. That is because, in each example discussed, the
notes purport to support the text rather than suggest why a different, hitherto unaccepted, rule should be
adopted.
22. They are Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, and Rhode Island.
Gathering the state of the law in the various jurisdictions can be a harrowing business. I and my research
assistant have done the best we can for purposes of this article. We apologize in advance for mistakes
that may result from the passage of time since our research concluded or from inaccurate reporting of
state provisions in the literature.
In referring to state codes, I will not cite to each jurisdiction's provisions. Most can be found in the
National Reporter on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, which is organized by state, and
through the ABA/BNA Manual on Professional Conduct, which notes recent changes.
23. They are Maryland, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah.
Maryland, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah have adopted a variation of alternative 2 to § 117B.
24. Many noted commentators have questioned the value of statistical analysis. As Mark Twain used
to say, "there are three kinds of falsehoods ... lies, damn lies, and statistics." Perhaps the most poignant
practical application of the ;riticism is Yogi Berra's statistical approach to baseball. He claimed, "90%
of the game is 1/2 mental."
25. They are Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wyoming, and Wisconsin. Several of these states have made some disclosures mandatory, including
Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Michigan has adopted a variation of alternative 2 to
§ 117B.
26. They include Cornecticut, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin.
Connecticut, New Jersey, Nevada, and Wisconsin have adopted a variation of alternative 2 to § 117B.
[Vol. 46:73
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want more disclosure than the Restatement would allow. Although the ALI position
is a compromise, it is one that not many jurisdictions have accepted thus far.
This discrepancy between the "restated" law and the actual rules in the vast
majority of states raises several questions. Should the ALI be trying to broker
compromise among states that cannot agree on a single rule? Should the ALI adopt
positions that the membership thinks are correct, but which do not reflect the actual
law? And finally, in taking its positions, how candid should the ALI be about what
it is doing?
Comment d, which would allow disclosures to prevent future consequences of
some completed acts, raises similar questions. It seems to suggest a considerable
change in the law. Consider illustration 1, which can be paraphrased simply as
follows: A lawyer learns that a client corporation has committed the past crime of
dumping toxic substances. The lawyer believes someone will be hurt in the future
by the dumped substance. The Restatement says the lawyer may disclose to prevent
or lessen the future harm to victims'
Under Model Rule 1.6, the potential harm is not disclosable both because there
is no criminal act left to prevent and because the harm is not imminent.' It is not
disclosable under the Code of Professional Responsibility either, because the Code
allows lawyers to disclose only when the lawyer learns of the client's intent to
commit a crime in the future' In illustration 1, the client has already done all it
plans to do. The Restatement's apparent change in the law may be a drafting
oversight that will be resolved in the final version; that is, the final draft may clarify
that comment d is not meant to apply to fully completed acts. Unless the original
position is amended, however, the ALI does seem to be proposing a major
substantive and theoretical shift.
There is one argument for disclosability under the codes. The past crime of
dumping might be considered an ongoing or future crime because it may turn into
assault or murder at the point when someone is injured. But that interpretation is
not consistent with the spirit of confidentiality that is embodied in the existing
professional codes. The client in the illustration is a traditional client, talking with
the lawyer about how to deal with past conduct for which the client may be
27. The full text of illustration 1 states:
At a meeting with engineers employed by Client Corporation, Lawyer learns that one of
the engineers has violated a criminal statute by releasing a toxic substance into a city's
sewer drainage system. From information available, Lawyer reasonably believes that the
discharge will cause death or serious bodily injury, that the lawyer's disclosure of
discharge will permit authorities to remove that threat or lessen the number of its victims,
that the need to take preventive action is immediate, and that efforts to persuade
responsible Client Corporation personnel to take corrective action would be unavailing.
Although the act creating the threat has already occurred, the Lawyer has discretion to use
or disclose under this section for the purpose of preventing the consequences of the act.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOvERNING LAWYERS § I17B cmt. d, illus. (1), at 65 (Tentative Draft No.
3, 1990).
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983).
29. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY DR 4-101(B)(3) (1969).
1993]
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criminally punished. Under traditional reasoning, this client needs to be able to
consult.6
The magnitude of the proposed change can best be understood by considering
some examples of cases in which most current codes of professional conduct
probably .would insist upon confidentiality, but in which the Restatement might
allow disclosure. Consider first the famous Macumber case:3' A lawyer knows that
his client has committed a murder for which an innocent man is about to be
punished. For many commentators, Macumber is the paradigm case for confidenti-
ality. The societal and third party interests in disclosure are enormous, yet allowing
disclosure might prevent the client from telling the lawyer the truth. The traditional
balance of interests concludes that encouraging frankness, enabling the lawyer to
maximize his effectiveness, and opening the possibility that the lawyer can persuade
the client to do the right thing warrants an assurance of confidentiality. 2 Comment
d of the Restatement takes the opposite tack.33
There are many less dramatic examples. Consider, for example, a lawyer who
knows that a client has embezzled money - arguably committing more fraud each
day as interest is lost.' Or, consider the thief who tells his lawyer that he still
possesses the fruits of his crime, thus violating concealing stolen property laws and,
in the process, continuing to injure the victim.35 One might conceive of these as
ongoing crimes, but to do so robs society and clients of the benefits of confidentiali-
ty described above. For the most part, the existing codes resolve the balance in
favor of encouraging the person who has committed a past criminal act to seek
counsel.' The Restatement does not.
30. For a full discussion of the traditional justifications of strict confidentiality rules, see generally
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 17.
31. State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz.) (holding information about other suspect's innocence
subject to attorney-client privilege), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1976).
32. See Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 17, at 358-61 & nn. 31-38.
33. Interestingly, the meporters proposed including an illustration based on Macumber in the section
defining confidentiality. Tie membership considered the paradigm case "offensive," and ordered it
removed. See 5 ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDucr 158, 159 (1989)
(describing debate on and ultimate rejection of the Macumber illustration). One thus can see that, in
proposing the exception encompassed by comment D, the membership is serious about changing
confidentiality's scope.
34. Cf Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Comm'n on Legal Ethics, Op. No. 267 (Jan. 26, 1960), in
38 L.A. BAR BULL. 103, 104-05 (1963) (stating that under strict California confidentiality rule, a lawyer
representing a guardian who admits previously embezzling funds from her ward may not disclose the
guardian's plan to file a fraudulent accounting because this future act is an offshoot, or ramification, of
"[the] past crime of embezzlement"); Ala. State Bar, Op. 82-623 (n.d.), excerpted in ABA/BNA MANUAL
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Ethics Ops., at 801:1034 (stating that a lawyer may not disclose that a
client previously made misrepresentations about property ownership in a bankruptcy proceeding even if
the consequences upon the potential distributees has yet to be felt).
35. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 405 (Aug. 13, 1975) (stating that
a lawyer for a client who admits a previous larceny may not disclose the client's ongoing crime of
concealing stolen property because disclosure "would connect the client with the past crime of larceny
[and] ... in essence would constitute the disclosure of a past crime").
36. See J. Michael Callan & Harris David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of
Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 332, 363
[Vol. 46:73
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What is important for my purposes is not whether one agrees with the substance
of the Restatement's proposed exceptions. My question is about the way the changes
are coming about. In both examples I've discussed - section 117B and comment
d - the Restatement asserts new positions, while appearing to be restating the law.
There are other instances of the same phenomena throughout the confidentiality
sections of the draft. 7 The Restatement expands the scope of confidentiality, while
claiming to use the Model Rules definition.3 The Restatement sometimes would
allow lawyers to reveal confidences without permission when disclosure will not
harm the client.3 It may expand when lawyers may disclose in self-defense.
All of these changes may be substantively correct. But it seems clear from a
process perspective that the reporters are doing more than simply restating the
existing law. Professor Wolfram's introduction and good intentions aside, in the
confidentiality sections at least, the Restatement is advocating a relatively controver-
sial (if not entirely new) position. It is proposing model provisions that, apparently,
the ALI hopes will be adopted uniformly. Even if that is an appropriate agenda for
the ALI, one must still ask whether it is appropriate for the Restatement to take
positions without clearly identifying them and volunteering which are new.
That leads us back to questions posed by the presentations of Professor Schneyer
and Wolfram. "What is the ALIT "Why the restatements?"
Like many institutions, the restatement process has, of late, been subjected to some
revisionist history.4' But if we look at the early history honestly, it is clear what the
(1976) ("When an attorney has been advised by his client of continuing aspects of a past crime, any
disclosure of such information ... would inevitably result in the disclosure of the past crime itself or
at least some aspect of it.... [E]thics opinions construing the Disciplinary Rules and the former Canons
have been virtually unanimous in holding that the attorney must not disclose the client's criminal
conduct").
37. For a full discussion of the following and other hidden changes in the Restatement, see
Zacharias, Fact and Fiction, supra note 2, at 905-12.
38. The Restatement's definition of confidentiality includes anything learned from or "about a client
or a client's matters" if the lawyer learns the information "during the course of the representation...
or at a time before the representation begins or after it ends. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 112, at 26 reporter's note (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1990). The definition of Model Rule 1.6
is limited to matters relating to the representation. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1983).
39. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1990)
(forbidding disclosure of confidences only "if there is a reasonable likelihood that doing so will adversely
affect a material interest of the client or if the client has directed that the lawyer not use or disclose it.").
40. Under Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), lawyers may disclose to protect themselves in official proceedings
brought against the lawyer. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983). Section
116 of the Restatement allows such use whenever a lawyer "reasonably believes necessary in order to
defend the lawyer against a charge by any person that the lawyer... acted wrongfully." RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWvYERS § 116 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1990). The Restatement thus seems
to advance the stage at which the self-defense exception can be triggered.
41. See N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American
Law Institute, 8 LAW & HisT. REV. 55, 56 (1990) (suggesting that commonly accepted descriptions of
the goals of the ALl founders are misguided). Even those who dispute the true intentions of the founders,
1993]
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restatements were all about. The founders of the ALI proposed the original
restatements in order to respond to a growing, overwhelming, and "indigestible
mass" of law.42
To understand that goal, one has to consider what's bad about a "mass" of law.
After all, without it, lawyers and law professors probably would be out of a job. As
the founders of the AJLI saw it, lawyers and judges had become intimidated. They
had no time to research and read all the relevant statutes and cases. Their response
was to focus on the few authorities available in their own jurisdictions, to the
exclusion of all others. The founders feared that this practice caused a loss of
perspective, because the few state authorities might be idiosyncratic - out of kilter
with the general common law.43
The founders hoped to solve the problem by identifying principles accepted
throughout the United States. They expected the restatements to isolate not just
majority rules, but rather legal norms that judges and lawyers could use as a
backdrop in evaluating their own jurisdictions' case law." The reason the founders
thought they could achieve this was because the original ALI was a body of highly
respected intellectuals - ranging from Supreme Court justices,4" to leaders of the
bar,4 to some of the best law professors alive.47 Moreover, the ALI's resources
however, concede that the', were forced to compromise any desire to propose changes in the law. Id. at
74-83. Hidden agendas aside, the restatements were to "promote the clarification and simplification of
the law." William Draper Lewis, How We Did It, in ALI, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
AND THE FIRsT RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW I (ALI ed., 1945); see also A. James Casner, Restatement
(Second) of Property as an Instrument of Law Reform, 67 IOWA L. REv. 87, 88 (1981) (noting that the
first ALI director restricted the restatement process to determining "what the law is"); cf. W. Noel Keyes,
The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a Proposalfor Its Amelioration, 13 PEPP. L. REv.
23, 27-28 (1985) (discussing history of debate over purpose of the original restatements).
42. Lewis, supra note 41, at 1 (discussing contemporary sense that the "'growing indigestible mass
of decisions' threatened the continuance of our common law system of expressing and developing law");
see also Norris Darrell & Paul Wolkin, N.Y. ST. BJ., Feb. 1980, at 99 (describing how "uncertainty and
complexity" of the common law "made it impossible to advise persons of their rights and ... created
delay and expense"); Keye;, supra note 41, at 24 (discussing goal of reducing mass of case law); Warren
A. Seavey, The Restatement, Second, and Stare Decisis, 48 A.B.A. J. 317, 318 (1962) (same).
43. See, e.g., Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance,
75 CAL. L. REv. 15 (1987) ("mhis codification of the common law was intended to create an edifice
that would make it unnecessary to refer to the larger underlying body of case law."); BENJAMIN N.
CARDOzO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 4-5 (1924) (noting that most important justification for the
restatements was the multitude of cases and judges' inability to cope with that multitude).
44. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY at viii-ix (1936) (stating that restatement's goal was to provide a
"correct statement of the general law of the United States" as a means to help judges and practitioners
cope with "the ever increaing volume of cases"); Address of Elihu Root in Presenting the Report of the
Committee, 1 A.L.I. PROC. pt. II, at 48, 48, 51 (1923) (noting that "the vast multitude of decisions...
was reaching a magnitude which made it impossible in ordinary practice to consult them" and expressing
expectation that the ALl could establish a "practical primafacie statement" of the common law).
45. The attendees at the founding conference included Chief Justice Taft, and Justices Holmes and
Sanford. See Lewis, supra note 41, at 3. Benjamin Cardozo was a strong proponent of the ALl. See
infra text accompanying n 3te 71.
46. Among the practicing bar, Draper Lewis saw no person more influential than Elihu Root. See
Hull, supra note 41, at 74-87 (describing process of wooing Root); Lewis, supra note 41, at 4-5
(describing importance of Root to the enterprise). Lewis promptly enlisted him as the ALI's first
[Vol. 46:73
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enabled it to attract the finest scholars as reporters48 and to provide them with all
the technical assistance they would need. The founders thought that if the well-
respected people associated with the project could identify rules as accepted
principles and put their authority behind the principles, the world would trust the
product
The reporters for the early restatements zealously protected that aura of trust.
They repeatedly refused to use the restatements to do more than "restate" the law.
When an issue was controversial, they tended to note that fact and either avoided
taking a position, or offered alternative approaches." So it went through the first
set of restatements.
By the time of the second restatements, several things had changed. First, the
original restatements were complete. To write a second round just to update recent
developments would have been, at the least, boring for the next set of reporters.
Legal reasoning as a whole also had matured. The notion of law evolving over
time had firmly taken hold. That affected the original assumption that there was a
law which was capable of being "restated."
Third, the few original restatement provisions that had proposed something new,
like section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts on promissory estoppel,5 had
significant influence on the courts. That whetted the appetites of subsequent drafters
to have an impact on the law.
Finally, and maybe most importantly, a vast legal reporting system had come into
its own. Cases now were digested, indexed, and cross-referenced. The mass of
cases actually had increased, but it was no longer indigestible.' Judges, lawyers,
and clerks could access and deal with it. That made restatements in the original
form less important - just another treatise, or secondary source.
None of these developments were lost on the ALL. In a policy drafted by Herbert
Wechsler in the 1960s, the Institute authorized the reporters of the second
restatements to propose minority rules on novel issues when two preconditions were
(honorary) president.
47. For example, Arthur Corbin, Edmund Morgan, John Wigmore, and James Parker Hall. See Hull,
supra note 41, at 70.
48. For example, Samuel Williston (contracts), Francis Bohlen (torts), Joseph Beale (conflicts), and
Floyd Mechem (agency).
49. Darrell & Wolkin, supra note 42, at 139 (noting importance of "reputation" of the restatement
drafters, members of the Advisory Council, and the ALI in helping the restatements "[speak] with
authority"); Hull, supra note 41, at 74-78, 82 (discussing ALl founders realization that restatement
needed to be backed by the "authority" of leading members of the bar as well as leading academics).
50. Casner, supra note 41, at 88 (noting that the reporters' adherence to the restatement principles
"led to the use of caveats in which the Institute stated that it took no position in regard to [controversial]
areas").
51. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs § 90 (1932); cf. Covey T. Oliver, The American Law Institute's
Draft Restatement of the Poreign Relations Law of the United States, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 428, 434 (1961)
(citing § 90 as a rare exception to the original restatement's policy of adhering to established law).
52. See Berring, supra note 43, at 23 ("[T]he comprehensive philosophy of reporting introduced by
the West company had too deeply infected the habit and goals of American legal researchers" to allow
them to rely simply upon principles noted by the restatement.).
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satisfied: (1) the new approach represented a better rule than the old, and (2) the
membership was convinced that the courts would adopt the new approach in the
future.53
Hence, the second restatements took on a whole range of questions the first
restatements might not have touched on the grounds that the law was unrestatable.4
We see the second re:statements attaching case-appendices illustrating splits in the
court. And we see notes, comments, and illustrations illuminating the debates and
explaining why the ALI position should be chosen.
Today, we have entered phase three, inaugurated by the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers. Part of this restatement deals with traditional restatement
subjects - like malpractice case law, evidentiary privileges, and the like. But other
parts, such as the confidentiality sections, are novel in scope. They concern issues
covered by professional codes, not just case law. These are codes that most states
have debated not only recently, but also at great length.
Let us assume that it is a good idea for the ALI to concern itself with these
topics. What are the ALI's choices in presenting disputed issues, like confidentiali-
ty, that are covered by the state codes? In the area of confidentiality, for example,
one option is simply to present the majority rule. Currently, that would be the Code
of Professional Responsibility rule. Second, the ALI could present, as alternative
proposals, all rules that more than a few states have adopted. Another choice would
be to pick a compromise position, for compromise's sake. Or, finally, the ALI
could pick what the ALI membership determines is the best rule and then try to use
the ALI influence to persuade states to adopt it. The last option seems to be what
the ALI has chosen hare.
But consider how the ALI is seeking to accomplish that task. In the political
world we have created, the proposed restatement seems to be sneaking positions by.
The draft tries to convince readers that its position is the majority position. It uses
illustrations that change the law, but characterizes the illustrations as reflecting
traditional rules.
It may be true that presenting a matter to get one's way is very lawyerly. The
advocate's approach probably comes naturally to the legally trained membership of
the ALI. But that doas not make it the most sensible approach in a restatement
context.
Even though I agree with much of the draft, I am troubled by the ALI's advocacy
on these controversial confidentiality topics. My concern, in no small measure,
derives froni my belief that the ALI cannot get away with the approach. Too much
attention has been paid to confidentiality issues to expect that the legal community
will fail to notice the hidden changes. 55 If the advocacy element in the confidential-
53. See Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J 147 (1969) (describing
policy and its adoption).
54. See Darrell & Wolkin, supra note 42, at 142 (stating that the "Restatement, Second, anticipated
some remarkable changes in the law," such as strict tort liability (RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A (1964)) and the landlord's implied warranty of habitability (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§§ 5.1 to 5.5 (1976).
55. See authorities cited supra note 6.
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ity sections is noticed, that may affect how the legal world views the Restatement
as a whole.'
Is there an alternative? Given the split among the states, can the Restatement
address confidentiality in a more useful way? It is beyond dispute that states take
positions all over the lot on the issue of confidentiality. If Professor Wolfram truly
sees his task as confined to restating the law, he is in an impossible position
because there may not really be a law that is restatable.
My view is that the ALI should accept that reality, when it is the reality, and
cease pursuing a utopian, and impossible, result. Instead, the ALI should use its
unique resources to seek, in some way, to improve upon the consideration the states
gave the professional codes. In order to do so, the ALI must specially craft its
approach.
First, and most obviously, the Restatement should explain why any new position
it adopts is appropriate. To be helpful, the Restatement has to demonstrate why the
ALI's respected membership of judges, lawyers, and scholars all agree that it is
correct to quit the majority approach. In contrast, if the members simply seem to
be voting personal preferences or adopting reporters' preferences, why should any
jurisdiction that has recently debated the issue defer?'
Second, the ALI should recognize that most states adopted their codes based
solely on an instinct about how the ABA models would work. Since then, quite a
number of empirical studies have been published on the operation of the rules.5
I suggest that it would be fruitful for the ALI to collect and rely on that type of
information, because it adds something new to the debate.
Why would I place this burden on the ALI, rather than the states themselves?
The answer lies in a combination of the ALI's historical function and the nature of
the resources at its disposal. As a neutral, intellectual body guided by academic
reporters, the ALI can evaluate the data impartially. Perhaps more importantly, the
ALI has the financial wherewithal and the ability to draw on the goodwill of the
type of scholars who would be needed to conduct empirical research. 9
56. The ALl has always been aware of this danger, prompting members to caution against any
departure from the historical mission of restating black letter law. See, e.g., Statement of Fred B. Helms,
in 42 A.L.I. PROC. 346 (1965) ("I thought the purpose of the Institute was to state the law, as it is and
not what we should desire it to be"). In 1965, the year in which the ALI seriously started to debate u
new policy for writing restatements, see supra text accompanying notes 52-54, Laurent Varnum stated:
[Tihe more the Restatement tends to outrun or to predict or to try to state what the law
ought to be, the less the legal profession tends to accept it as a true statement of what the
law is, and the more will the Restatement be vulnerable to attack by those who disagree
with its conclusions.
42 A.L.I. PROC 355 (1965).
57. Cf. Fred B. Helms, The Restatements: Existing Law or Prophecy, 56 A.B.A. J. 152, 153 (1970)
(arguing that restatements' proposals of small minority positions "may possibly lose the hard-won
preeminence they have so justly deserved").
58. See, e.g., Zacharias, Fact and Fiction, supra note 2, at 928 n.117.
59. See id. at 920, 929 (discussing financial resources of the ALl). The ALI, too, seems to be
suffering some squeeze in these harsh economic times. Yet its most recent annual report suggests that
the organization is financially sound. The ALI's scholarly projects are funded by a combination of
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In addition to gathering empirical information in its purest sense, the ALI is in
a position to collect factual data concerning the actual operation of different
categories of rules. A few states have put into practice aberrational confidentiality
provisions. In Brandeis's words, these states have offered themselves as "laborato-
ries."' They offer the ALI an opportunity to evaluate the actual effect of new and
different approaches.
For example, California insists on absolute confidentiality.6 What impact has
California's rule had? In a recent case, the San Diego County Bar issued an ethics
opinion adhering to the position that a lawyer may not disclose a client's intention
to kill a codefendant who had agreed to cooperate with the prosecution.' The case
undermines the assumption of many observers that states with strict rules don't
mean what they say. 'the ALI is in a position to collect such extreme cases and use
them to focus the debate on whether'we truly can or want to live with the results
of strict confidentiality doctrine.
At the other extreme, New Jersey and a few others have a mandatory disclosure
rule.' These put to the test many of the important factual hypotheses of the more
traditional confidentiality rules.' The ALI's brain trust is both capable of and well
suited to evaluating the results of the test, insofar as judgments can be made at this
date. How have the rules been administered? Has any negative effect on the legal
system or on the use of lawyers been documented?
Relying on this kind of empirical and factual information - information that
states have not previously had before them - can enhance the influence of the
ALI's proposals. In other words, the ALI's method of persuasion would confirm the
legal community's inclination to pay respect to the ALI position.
Finally, as a mixed group of judges, lawyers, and scholars, the ALI is well
situated to identify changes in the legal profession. What I find perhaps most
surprising about the Restatement chapter on confidentiality is not that it includes
earmarked endowments, general endowments, and a general fund that supplements the revenues from
those endowments. Last year, the Restatement project's expenditures of nearly half a million dollars were
supported by $294,000 in endowments and a $177,000 transfer from the general fund. The general fund
retained a balance of nearly five million dollars, and took in revenues exceeding expenses of $477,000.
See Report of the Treasurer, in ALI, ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1992).
60. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932) (discussing importance of
allowing states to "serve we a laboratory and try novel social ... experiments").
61. CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1993); see also San Diego County Bar Ass'n Legal
Ethics & Unlawful Practices Comm., Op. 1990-1 (1990) (stating that California lawyer may not disclose
client's intent to kill third party).
62. San Diego County Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics & Unlawful Practices Comm., Op. 1990-1 (1990).
63. See, e.g., ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1990); NEW JERSEY RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT F:PC 1.6 (1984).
64. See Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 17, at 361-70 (questioning the empirical
basis for some of the facttal assumptions underlying confidentiality rules). Indeed, to the extent less
stringent confidentiality rules have not had significant effect on clients' use of lawyers, that may give
support the proposition that under some circumstances strict confidentiality rules are unconstitutional.
See also Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II; Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA
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new ideas. Whenever one puts imaginative scholars like Chuck Wolfram, John
Leubsdorf, Tom Morgan, and Linda Mullenix in the same room, one has to expect
that.' Rather what surprises me is that the proposed restatement seems to buy
completely into the mindset of the professional codes. The Restatement accepts all
the old assumptions: all lawyers are the same, and confidentiality is the same, no
matter who is practicing, what she's practicing, or where she's practicing.
Would not the Restatement be an ideal place to introduce some recognition that
the term lawyering is shorthand for a variety of professions? There are differences
among law firm lawyers, corporate counsel, and solo practitioners. Their clients
vary in sophistication and expectations, and often exhibit disparate ability to protect
their own interest in confidentiality. The importance of protecting the clients vis-A-
vis third parties thus may vary.
Similarly, it is not gospel that lawyers should act identically when serving in
different capacities. Consider, for example, the lawyer who acts as a bank's agent
in completing government disclosure reports, as in the now infamous Kaye, Scholer
case.' Even if the adversarial ideal supports strict confidentiality for lawyers in
litigation, it may not justify allowing a bank to avoid its own reporting obligations
in the regulatory setting. The bank's choice of a lawyer to represent it in making
legally required responses may justify the government in viewing the lawyer more
as the bank's alter ego than its legal advocate.
Finally, because perspectives on confidentiality may vary among subgroups of
lawyers, a single set of confidentiality rules may be applied unevenly.67 Criminal
defense lawyers and transactional real estate lawyers may reasonably have different
views of their obligations. Although they may not admit it in public, many lawyers
clearly assume the existence of these differences."8 Once the reality of the
differences is acknowledged, rule makers may come to see the benefits of writing
more nuanced rules.
65. Professors Leubsdorf, Morgan, and Mullenix are the associate reporters working on the
Restatement.
66. See 8 ABA/BNA MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr 77, 109, 264 (1992) (discussing
implications of settlement between the Office of Thrift Supervision and Kaye, Scholer law firm for firm's
failure to disclose its client's misleading answers to government regulators). The OTS position in the
Kaye, Scholer case squarely raises the issue of whether lawyers who represent regulated industrial clients
before the regulating agency have different obligations than when acting as litigators in court.
67. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Theory and Specificity of Legal Ethics Codes, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. -, - n. 104 (forthcoming Nov. 1993) (discussing importance of recognizing subgroupings of
lawyers).
68. That is seen, vividly, in a misguided response by a real estate lawyer to a survey on
confidentiality. "Confidentiality," he said, "doesn't apply to me because I don't practice litigation." See
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 17, at 393 n.24. It is also reflected in the statement of
the divorce lawyer who asked by Austin Sarat whether privilege posed a problem for Sarat's sitting in
and observing the lawyers interviews with clients. "Mr. Sarat," the divorce lawyer reportedly said, "it
would be a privilege to have you observe." Speech by Austin Saint at the 1989 AALS Convention (Jan.
1989) (reporting on study subsequently published as Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and
Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1669-87 (1989).
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I do not know precisely how to reconcile the differences among lawyers and their
perspectives for purposes of confidentiality. Yet it is clear to me from the Kaye,
Scholer development; and from cases like Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California' and Nix v. Whiteside" that the world of professional responsibility is
changing. Lawyers and the codes are going to have to come to grips with those
changes. What better body than an integrated ALI to give the legal community a
push.
A key moment ler.ding to the creation of the ALI was a speech by Benjamin
Cardozo. He said:
The American Law Institute ... is the first cooperative endeavor by
all the groups engaged in the development of law to grapple with the
monster of uncertainty and slay him. Its work will be a scientific and
accurate restatement of the law. It will be invested with unique
authority, not to command but to persuade. It will embody a composite
thought and speak a composite voice. Universities and bench and bar
will have had a part in its creation. If these men cannot restate the law,
then the law is incapable of being restated by anyone.7! '
Cardozo and the ALI founders conceived the ALI as an organization of
experience. It was to be a body of teachers and mentors - wise people joined to
help us, the less worldly practitioners, judges, and academics. The ALI's teachings
were to help us cope when the law was in disarray, were to give us a push when
the law was in a rut.
The ALI does not accomplish its functions, even as amended over time, when it
advocates instead of teaches. It cannot teach by hiding or sliding by the facts.
When the ALI fails to be forthright, 'even if only in small respects or isolated
instances, its entire project cannot help but lose respect. That would be sad, because
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers has much to add.
69. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (holding psychiatrist liable for failing to disclose the fact that his client
posed a physical threat to third party); cf Hawkins v. Department of Rehabilitation Servs., 602 P.2d 361
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (distinguishing Tarasoff, but suggesting that attorney liability also might be
possible). Were lawyers to become liable for failing to disclose client information, their view of their
obligation of confidentialiy to clients would undoubtedly be affected.
70. 471 U.S. 1034 (1986) (questioning "pure" adversarial theory of lawyers' role).
71. CARDOZO, supra note 43, at 6-7.
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